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25X1 Chefinspekteur Dölling (Chief of Hauptabteilung Polit/Kultur)

- At the last school commandants' conference in December I stated that with the end of the first training period plus Christmas leave we would be able to make an estimate of the political and morale level. This first leave is over and I believe that we are now better equipped than we were at that time to judge the political state of the members of our organization.
- The situation after the return of the students was described at a Polit/Kultur conference as follows: we have toiled for 34 hours, have tried to imbue our men with political knowledge, and it has all been in vain. They returned in a negative frame of mind. This opinion was not expressed in only one school, but in other schools and Bereitschaften, too. Also, there has been an increasing incidence of absence without leave, which requires more vigilance on our part.
- There have been lively discussions about the Oder-Neisse line. For example, during a discussion some Volkspolizisten said that one ought to be prepared to re-conquer the lost East territory with armed force. Or: "I am prepared to use my gun to attack the Czechoslovak Republic." We welcome the free expression of such false views. We must ask ourselves how well we have cleared up the question of the Oder-Neisse line. If, for example, these boys state that we will be able to live better only after getting back the Eastern territory, then that must be considered a fascist trend.

In regard to the question of the Oder-Neisse line, the political confusion and inefficiency are still great; we cannot yet drop the issue, but must try again and again to make it clear.

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4. Another bad matter is the arrogance expressed in derogatory remarks about the accomplishments of the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. The school commandants should be extremely alert in this respect. From the very start the right measures must be taken. Relations with the Soviet Union must improve.
5. Influences from the West must be more consistently counteracted. A case in point is the widely current discussion of the HVA pay reductions; then the inauguration of the general draft in the Soviet Zone, or the students' argument that what they are told is happening in Western Germany (viz western rearmament) lacks proof, all of which adds up to their conclusion that the next phase in our training program is unwarranted. A strong trend along these lines does exist - an unwillingness to understand. We must place all our strength behind the laying of an ideological foundation in order to indoctrinate our Volkspolizisten as to why they have been given weapons.
6. The boys return from leave in a strikingly pessimistic frame of mind, because they are unable to stand up to the hostility directed at them (Anfeindungn von ausen). In this respect women play a special role; this is a machination of the enemy. Consequently we have to admit that after 4 months of training, our Volkspolizisten have not yet learned to counter political arguments. Although they have acquired political knowledge, they lack practical experience in debating. On the other hand, this does not prove that our political work has so far been in vain. Anyone who says so wants to start a panic.
7. Another part of the student body claims that civilians are backward, indicating that they have noted the difference between themselves and civilians. This is a sign that they have learned something. We can claim to have made progress and to have imparted political knowledge. We must be careful, however, not to make the mistake of taking too much for granted. Our boys are all right, they are intelligent, but we cannot expect too much. Our most important task is to prepare our students for political debates through Polit/Kultur work. For our Volkspolizisten to learn a lesson by heart is of no use. What we give them must serve to make them political instruments capable of doing their share to change the situation. Our practical work has to be adjusted accordingly.
8. Has our polit-training program been set up correctly, or is it too difficult? How are we to give out political stuff to our students? We are now revising our political training program to profit by practical training experiences. We believe that changes will have to be made to bring certain subjects up to date, do away with following rigid routine, to add several subjects. That part concerning the Soviet Union will be expanded, because we want to show how life is in a socialist state. We want to provide stimulants. We must check continuously to learn which methods are best suited for successful indoctrination.
9. If we continue presenting our training guides (Dispositionen) in considerable detail, it should not lead to the practice of merely reading them off. It is extremely important that a lecture be thoroughly prepared beforehand. The lecturer must work out his problems independently and not merely copy the training guides. A lecture should be delivered from deepest conviction. Our training guides are designed merely as models. It is up to the Polit/Kultur chief to see to it that no lecturer delivers his lecture to the students without thorough preparation. To give a lecture without preparation is an offence against the students. The lecturer must realize the importance of his duty. He ought to know more than just what he is lecturing on. He must have a comprehensive knowledge of the problems. He must be thorough. We must rid ourselves of the habit of

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talking about everything. We ought to deal intensively with a few questions instead. We must endeavor to make our lectures interesting. Not every lecturer is a competent teacher.

10. Our major task is to convert young people into defenders of the DDR. Our system of exchanging (information on practical) experiences has so far been inadequate. Within the near future we shall expand it so as to make our (information on practical) experiences useful to other schools also.

11. I believe that there should be more emphasis on agitation in political indoctrination in our schools and Bereitschaften. We agitate too little. We ought to approach people with a definite point of view. Polit/Kultur work is educational work. But Polit/Kultur workers also have their weaknesses. I frequently get the impression that Polit/Kultur work is isolated in the school command. I wish to stress that never before has it been so necessary to realize that moral education is a concern not merely of the Polit/Kultur Abteilung, but also of the school command.

12. Our Polit/Kultur personnel is not yet working entirely according to plan. The Polit/Kultur chief and school commandant have to work out together a program for 4 to 6 weeks in advance. This plan should cover Party and Youth work, cultural care, sports, etc. The Polit/Kultur chiefs must guide their assistants in their work. We have a strong Polit/Kultur organization which is adequate.

13. Another relevant question is quality. It is up to the Polit/Kultur chiefs to give the proper assignments to their staff. A Polit/Kultur functionary who looks after the heating of the dayroom but who has no idea of what else is expected of him will not do. Some of our Polit/Kultur functionaries are too high up in the clouds. They do not know what is going on in the companies. Many of them do not know what the students are talking about. As an example, the Oder-Neisse line was put to vote in the Glüwen school. That sort of thing should not happen and could not have happened if the Polit/Kultur chief had known his staff.

14. When a student deserts, we should ask ourselves what kind of a person this deserter is. An investigation usually shows that some pertinent observations had already been made, but that no precautionary measures had been taken. The implications had not been communicated to the Polit/Kultur chief.

15. In several of our units subversive cells have been formed. Around them new cells form. They to some extent impede our work. In one Objekt, e.g., FDJ members carried on their disruptive work for weeks. Finally, one day they threw their weapons away. They had been influenced by the West. In order that everybody would be impressed with the reprehensible character of this action, the perpetrators had their shoulder pieces torn off before the assembled student body and afterwards were told to go to hell. In carrying out our political indoctrination program, we must succeed in making the students themselves feel the detestable nature of such an act so strongly that they say so vis a vis the culprits themselves.

16. Political information needs to be improved. Students should be induced to read the daily press attentively. There is too little discussion. It is the responsibility of FDJ personnel and of Party groups to form agitation teams who make it their business, whenever the opportunity presents itself, to engage in discussions. Organizational measures should be designed to bring about definite discussions. Practical experiences in this field have not yet been gathered.

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17. Plans call for a monthly one-day schooling conference, so that our Polit/Kultur personnel may have an opportunity to broaden its political knowledge.
18. We attach importance to improvement in the political knowledge of officers who teach military specialties. This I wish to emphasize again. The officer should avail himself of every possible opportunity for discussion. Also the so-called Fach-
offizier must learn how to engage in political discussions. Every officer should have sufficient time to devote to political problems.
19. The Polit/Kultur chief himself needs professional improvement. Only in this way can we be welded into a unit, serving a definite purpose. The result of all our work should be the forming of well-rounded Volkspolizisten, who are politically and professionally up on any given political situation, and who comprehend that they are carrying arms on account of the political situation. It is our duty as Volkspolizisten to assume the protection of the young DDR.
20. The powers of peace have grown in strength. To say then, that consequently the danger of war is receding, would be wrong. No, the war danger has increased. There is a continuous struggle between the two camps. Because: a beast at bay defends himself desperately. We must explain to our people that the imperialistic elements will never reconcile themselves to a new social order. The dispossessed do not fold their hands in their laps; they work against us wherever they are able to. With this thought in mind we should explain that we are unwilling to sacrifice our accomplishments and for this very reason we need a Volkspolizei. We must point this out over and over again. In a few months we shall probably be able to say more. The resolution of the Cominform Bureau (Informationsbüro) is going to be thoroughly analyzed.
21. The 1950 budget should be carefully discussed in the schools. Radical tendencies are spreading. There is no room for them within the framework of the "bloc policy." Songs should be checked with this thought in mind. The DDR is our first concern. Radical notes are well meant, but in the last analysis damaging.
22. The order that no civilians be admitted to the Objekte should be carried out without exceptions. This rule includes SED representatives. This should be clearly understood.
23. The political background of the Rohner-Hickmann case should be explained to the students.
24. The FDJ contest and its purpose are known. Schools and Bereitschaften have not yet fully realized that this contest can be turned into a tremendous factor in the attainment of our training goals. Helped by this contest, we can eliminate weaknesses which turn up in the training course. It can be turned into a tremendous mobilization factor if the school leadership makes the proper use of it.
25. We really want to be in a position to bring the best school or Bereitschaft to Berlin at Whitsuntide. We want to improve our work. Please work on this matter. Submit suggestions. The contest can rapidly advance our work. Speak your mind openly in the subsequent discussion.
26. We wish to state that the school leadership must realize that the maintenance of a Kollektiv and military and political training go hand in hand. This should be the course of action in every school. Because it rests with us to give the proper education to 11 000 people, we must master this task.

Chefinspekteur Walter Freytag, Kochstedt School

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where our Volkspolizisten go while on leave, where they get their negative attitude. I myself once witnessed someone at a farmers' meeting making propaganda for his old estate owner and openly contradicting my reports on the Soviet Union. In large factories, too, elements of this kind expound the most incredible arguments against the Soviet Union. Such machinations have the result that our young comrades often return influenced the wrong way. Those of us who have been in the Soviet Union are always in a position to describe the successes of the Russian people.

28. Hazen, Zittau

The formation of agitation groups can also be supported by the operations branch. We have already had good results. For example, while one group is firing on the range, the other group is required by agitation teams to engage in debate.

29. Berthold, Döbeln

If all officers, i.e., the training cadre, are to be given 8 hours Polit/Kultur training per week and if all Polit/Kultur instructors and all company Polit/Kultur officers are to be trained one day a month in addition to their regular schedule of instruction on Land level, then our own training schedule is bound to run into considerable difficulties. The absence of responsible instructors from the Objekt results in loss of indoctrination.

30. We propose that all Polit-instructors who are Party members be engaged to give from one to two lectures a month before Party meetings outside the Objekt. This will force them to take an interest in problems affecting the working population on the outside.

31. During the last few days the question whether the concentration of all former officers in leading positions is likely to threaten the development of our democratic republic, has come to light.

32. We have called the attention of our comrades to two books, "The Great Conspiracy" and the "Rajk Trial." It might help if the Polit/Kultur apparatus of the HVA could insert this matter in the training program of the schools.

33. During the leave period there was an instance of unnatural intercourse between two students. If such things are not watched, they can become dangerous for the school. The students in question were dismissed effective 31 January 1950.

34. A student, reprimanded while in a dance hall by a garrison patrol revenged himself by stating that now he would tell what the life of the students is really like. Finally, he tried to attack the patrol.

35. Two Volkspolizisten were accosted by a breathless girl, asking for help because she was being pursued by an officer of the Red Army. Far and wide no Soviet officer could be seen. In a later conversation the girl stated that a pay reduction was in the offing as a result of which many Volkspolizisten would quit the service. As it turned out she had learned this from her girl friends who in turn had been told this by other Volkspolizisten. During the investigation we shall try to determine whether these matters are organized.

36. Visitors from the West make a practice of inviting our comrades over to their restaurant tables, for a meal. These matters are also being investigated.

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37. As regards the FDJ contest, I have to confess that in Döbeln things have not been going the way I thought they would, the reason being that neither the FDJ nor the Party has become a stabilizing influence. We realize this and are trying to take remedial action.

38. The secret of building up a good company is collective collaboration between Party, FDJ, platoon leaders, company PK and company commander, i.e., the whole company. The young men who said this expressed very clearly how we can improve our work.

39. Also as regards our conferences, in the future, conferences should play the most important role in the Kolkktiv. Let's take a look at what happened yesterday: That was not a conference measuring up to the level which we expect of our school commandants. We shan't make progress by keeping mum, because it is through discussions during our conferences that we will be able to map our course for future work.

Comrade Zettler

40. How are we to equip our Volkspolizisten for political discussions, convert them politically and turn them into political factors? Before 1933 our strength lay in practical work. Our Party members were pragmatists rather than theoreticians. Today we are faced by the opposite situation. Our young comrades are theoretically well developed, but lack practical experience. They cannot as yet combine (verkoppeln) the two. Old, experienced comrades on the other hand lack theoretical development. By organizing circles, couldn't we bring these two opposites together?

41. Another weakness is that our Polit/Kultur instructors and also the Party functionaries fail to compile the arguments which are being used on the outside in the fight against us. Our Polit/Kultur instructors do not avail themselves of the lessons to refute the opponent's arguments.

Chefinspekteur Dölling

42. Calling the enemy the opponent in political instructions is certainly a good idea; there are, however, certain dangers connected with describing his political concepts too graphically (ein politisches Profil geben). I purposely did not mention any names, because we do not want to discredit persons. At the current stage of development that would not be a good thing to do.

43. Friendship toward the Soviet Union is the decisive factor in our policy. The opinion is held among the masses that the Soviet Union regime and collectivization are going to be forced upon them. It is our task to explain the function of the IAS. We should describe without exaggeration the accomplishments of the Soviet Union.

44. The necessary arrangements should be made to permit discussions during every free moment.

45. There cannot be any organizational ties with the civilian sphere. For example, Comrade Berthold cannot be Kreisvorstand of Döbeln district. To give a lecture, however, is not prohibited, as long as service does not suffer from it.

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46. There is no objection to having Volkspolized cultural performances for the benefit of the civilian population, provided these performances are good. What we don't want is the civilian population entering the Objekt. That kind of contact we frown upon.

47. In regard to the employment of high ranking officers, our point of view should be that in building up the DLR, all elements willing to contribute should be enlisted. History obviously teaches us that in the course of rehabilitation some people degenerate and others turn into positive elements aiding reconstruction.

48. The important thing now is to find a method whereby we can give our Volkspolizisten the political knowledge to enable them to participate in a political argument.

49. To wind up, I wish to reiterate that our work during the last four months has not been in vain. It is now up to us to turn into practical use those new experiences we have had.

Chefinspekteur Haitsch

50. Polit/Kultur work should not be confined to the lecture hall, but should be made to extend to all phases of the service.

51. I wish to stress that the functions of commandant's assistants (i.e., Sovietniks) are not limited to military (fachlich) matters but also include advisory capacities for the entire school and Bereitschaften program.

52. I told you yesterday that we wish to keep our military training simple, designed to impart a solid basic knowledge.

53. For your future work I want to pass the following thought along: Tackle symptoms of weariness energetically. Break with the policeman's pensioner ideal.

SECRET: The leitmotiv of DÜlling's address and the discussion period following it indicate obvious concern for the poor state of morale prevailing among the rank and file of the student body. The blame is placed on the patently deficient indoctrination phase of instruction. Trainees are still being influenced by Western thinking. During their Christmas leave, especially, they were unable to stand up against environmental influences of family and friends. One of the remedies suggested is an intensification of indoctrination designed to equip students with dialectic weapons which would enable them to defeat suborning influences from the West.

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